[ { "id": "2021-02-facebook-platform-block", "title": "Facebook blocked following the February 2021 coup", "class": "national", "type": "platform_block", "status": "unresolved", "date_start": "2021-02-03T00:00:00.000Z", "resolution_note": "Maintainer research (internal research notes, 2026-07): reclassified from ended/date_end=2021-02-07 to unresolved. No independent source confirms Facebook access was actually restored on Feb 7 as the junta's letter announced. BBC (Feb 3, 2021) reports Facebook was \"still reported to be accessible sporadically\" then \"stopped working completely\" hours later — already unstable before the announced Feb 7 date, not a clean scheduled cutoff. ARTICLE 19's 2022 retrospective repeats the \"until Feb 7\" order without documenting a restoration on that date either; instead the block became part of a broader, longer-running platform-blocking campaign. No date_end set — even Feb 7 itself isn't evidenced as an actual restoration, only as the government's announced intent, so it would be misleading to encode it as an estimated end date the way the nationwide-cut and nightly-curfew events use their own (source-derived, not announcement-derived) proxy dates.\n", "scope": { "regions": [], "townships": [], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "media", "at": "2021-02-04T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Committee to Protect Journalists reports Myanmar's Ministry of Communications ordered Facebook blocked 'until February 7', citing an official letter, on stability grounds following the Feb 1 coup.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "media" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Distinct from the broader nationwide connectivity cut on Feb 6 (see 2021-02-nationwide-connectivity-cut) — this is specifically the Facebook platform block, officially dated by the junta's own letter (per CPJ) as running Feb 3 to Feb 7. Whether service was actually restored on schedule on Feb 7 is not confirmed by any source in our current archive — the \"until February 7\" framing is the government's own announced intent, not an independently verified restoration date. Flag this distinction for an editor rather than presenting Feb 7 as a confirmed end.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Committee to Protect Journalists", "url": "https://cpj.org/2021/02/myanmars-military-should-lift-facebook-whatsapp-censorship-enable-news-broadcasts-following-coup/" }, { "label": "The Guardian", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/04/myanmar-coup-army-blocks-facebook-access-as-civil-disobedience-grows" }, { "label": "BBC: Myanmar coup - Facebook blocked by military", "url": "https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-55923486" }, { "label": "ARTICLE 19: Myanmar military's targeting of Facebook (2022 retrospective)", "url": "https://www.article19.org/resources/myanmar-militarys-targeting-of-facebook-ratchets-up-post-coup-assault-on-freedom-of-expression/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2021-02-facebook-platform-block.csv", "json": "/data/events/2021-02-facebook-platform-block.json" } }, { "id": "2021-02-nationwide-connectivity-cut", "title": "Nationwide mobile data and broadband cut following the February 2021 coup", "class": "national", "type": "full_blackout", "status": "unresolved", "date_start": "2021-02-06T00:00:00.000Z", "date_end": "2021-02-07T00:00:00.000Z", "end_date_confidence": "estimated", "resolution_note": "Maintainer research (internal research notes, 2026-07) found no single dated source stating \"nationwide mobile data fully restored on X.\" OONI's Mar 8, 2021 post states the initial total blackout (all internet, not just mobile) lasted ~30 hours and was largely lifted by Feb 7, 2021 — used here as date_end with end_date_confidence: estimated, since it is explicitly a proxy for the CLEAN, defensible anchor point, not a claim the full disruption named in this event's title ended then. Mobile data and social-media access remained heavily restricted for weeks after: an Asia Centre briefing describes mobile data still down as of Mar 31, 2021 (in what appears to be a renewed cut rather than the same continuous one — see 2021-nightly-curfew's date_end for the Mar 15, 2021 date that likely marks this renewal). Status stays unresolved, not ended, because Feb 7 only closes the initial acute blackout phase, not the full \"mobile data and broadband cut\" scope this event's title describes.\n", "scope": { "regions": [], "townships": [], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "corroborated", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "ooni_anomaly", "at": "2021-02-01T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "OONI's own February 2021 monthly aggregate: 443,319 measurements (roughly 4x a typical month in this dataset), 12.7% anomaly rate — both consistent with major disruption and a surge in probe activity, not by itself a precise same-day signal.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "media", "at": "2021-02-07T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Associated Press: mobile data services disappeared, accelerating sharply late morning on Saturday Feb 6; broadband failed later, with mixed reports on landline/mobile voice.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "media" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. STATUS CAVEAT, read before publishing: no source currently in this archive (STOP — which has no Myanmar record before Aug 2021 at all — digest, or site articles) confirms when this specific nationwide cutoff was resolved. STOP's dataset gap means this event cannot be STOP-anchored like most others. status is left as \"ongoing\" because that is what the available sources support (last confirmed as active Feb 7 per AP; no later source in this archive says it ended) — this is NOT a claim that the Feb 6, 2021 cutoff is literally still active in 2026. An editor or a future source pass should replace this with a real resolution date. IODA's historical BGP data does not reach back this far (checked live, 2026-07: empty response for Feb 2021) and our own BGP monitoring did not exist until 2026 — per spec, this layer is omitted rather than estimated, not silently assumed absent.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Associated Press", "url": "https://apnews.com/article/united-nations-myanmar-media-social-media-yangon-e7765d3459d386219ee1dca8ad1e089c" }, { "label": "OONI Explorer — retrospective analysis citing IODA's BGP/Active Probing/IBR signal drop on Feb 6, 2021", "url": "https://ooni.org/post/2021-investigating-internet-shutdowns-mozilla-telemetry/" }, { "label": "OONI: Myanmar internet blocks and outages (Mar 8, 2021)", "url": "https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/" }, { "label": "Internet Society Pulse: Further internet shutdown in Myanmar", "url": "https://pulse.internetsociety.org/en/shutdowns/further-internet-shutdown-in-myanmar/" }, { "label": "Asia Centre briefing note: Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns (30 Mar 2021)", "url": "https://asiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/Briefing-Note-Myanmar-Coup-and-Internet-Shutdowns.pdf" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2021-02-nationwide-connectivity-cut.csv", "json": "/data/events/2021-02-nationwide-connectivity-cut.json" } }, { "id": "2021-nightly-curfew", "title": "Nightly internet curfew era, 2021", "class": "national", "type": "throttle", "status": "unresolved", "date_start": "2021-02-11T00:00:00.000Z", "date_end": "2021-03-15T00:00:00.000Z", "end_date_confidence": "estimated", "resolution_note": "Maintainer research (internal research notes, 2026-07): no source states a discrete \"curfew lifted\" date. Wikipedia's \"Internet in Myanmar\" timeline and contemporaneous reporting (OONI, Asia Centre, Reuters) describe the 1am-9am curfew as in place through early/mid-March 2021, then effectively superseded by a stricter nationwide mobile-internet shutdown beginning Mar 15, 2021. date_end here uses Mar 15, 2021 as the most defensible proxy for when the curfew phase ended AS A DISTINCT PATTERN — flagged end_date_confidence: estimated since it marks supersession by a harsher measure, not a \"curfew lifted\" event. This independently corroborates this event's own narrative, which had already derived ~Mar 15 from RSF's 11-day mobile-cut figure before this research round.\n", "scope": { "regions": [], "townships": [], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "corroborated", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "ooni_anomaly", "at": "2021-02-01T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "OONI monthly aggregates for the period this curfew was reported active: Feb 2021 12.7% anomaly rate (443,319 measurements), Mar 2021 11.1% (111,902), Apr 2021 10.4% (84,416).", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "media", "at": "2021-04-02T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "The Guardian: 'a wider shutdown has been imposed every night for almost 50 days' (dating the curfew's start to approximately Feb 11-12, 2021), with mobile data separately cut for 18 days by that point (approx. since Mar 15) and new cuts extending to wireless broadband.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "media" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Date_start (Feb 11, 2021) is derived from The Guardian's April 2, 2021 \"almost 50 days\" framing, not a direct first-hand date — flag this as an inferred-from-reporting date, not a primary-source-confirmed one. Reporters Without Borders' March 25, 2021 piece separately describes \"fixed-line Internet disconnected every night, mobile Internet blocked for the past 11 days\" — the RSF ~11-day mobile figure (implying a start around Mar 14) is close to but not identical to the Guardian's implied Mar 15 mobile-cut date; both are kept here as independent corroborating estimates rather than reconciled to one precise date, since neither source states an exact date directly. STATUS CAVEAT: same as 2021-02-nationwide-connectivity-cut — no source in this archive confirms when the nightly curfew pattern ended; \"ongoing\" reflects that gap, not a literal 2026 claim. No BGP/IODA layer: unavailable for this period (see that event's note).\n", "sources": [ { "label": "The Guardian", "url": "https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/apr/02/myanmar-coup-military-expands-internet-shutdown" }, { "label": "Reporters Without Borders", "url": "https://rsf.org/en/myanmar-s-military-junta-eliminates-independent-media" }, { "label": "Wikipedia: Internet in Myanmar", "url": "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_in_Myanmar" }, { "label": "OONI: Myanmar internet blocks and outages (Mar 8, 2021)", "url": "https://ooni.org/post/2021-myanmar-internet-blocks-and-outages/" }, { "label": "Asia Centre briefing note: Myanmar Coup and Internet Shutdowns (30 Mar 2021)", "url": "https://asiacentre.org/wp-content/uploads/Briefing-Note-Myanmar-Coup-and-Internet-Shutdowns.pdf" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2021-nightly-curfew.csv", "json": "/data/events/2021-nightly-curfew.json" } }, { "id": "2022-kayah-mobile-blackout", "title": "Kayah State mobile internet blackout, 2022", "class": "regional", "type": "mobile_data", "status": "ongoing", "date_start": "2022-01-06T00:00:00.000Z", "scope": { "regions": [ "Kayah" ], "townships": [ "Loikaw", "Demoso", "Bawlakhe", "Hpasawng", "Mese" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2022-01-06T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: mobile internet virtually inaccessible for most of 2022 across five Kayah State townships (Loikaw from Jan 6, four others from Feb 1).", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "media", "at": "2026-04-30T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly (EngageMedia/myanmarinternet.info, Feb–Apr 2026): communication disruptions ongoing in Karenni (Kayah) State townships tied to active fighting — junta airstrike on Mawchi area (Hpasawng township) cut phone/internet during the quarter; only MPT/Mytel sporadically available, and only in Loikaw and Shadaw. Myanmar Now separately reports blackouts 'worsening' in Karenni State through 2025. Stale-ongoing check (M2 patch): this closes the >60-day gap with a dated, sourced confirmation rather than leaving the 2022 record to imply continuity on its own.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "ioda", "at": "2026-07-18T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "IODA cross-check (maintainer research, 2026-07): queried region 2748 (Kayah) directly. bgp: NO DATA before 2026-01-18, 2022 (region not yet instrumented by IODA at this event's Jan 6, 2022 start — a coverage-boundary null, not a signal); from 2022-01-18 through Dec 31, 2022 the signal is flat at 'fully up' (constant value=1) with zero drop detected anywhere in the STOP-reported 'most of 2022' window. ping-slash24: NO DATA for this region at any time queried, including a 2026-recent sanity check — a genuine, permanent coverage gap for Kayah on this datasource, not a time-window issue. Result: NO SIGNAL either datasource, consistent with sub-country/mobile-level resolution limits — a five-township mobile-data restriction would not necessarily show up in region-aggregate BGP prefix visibility. Does not corroborate or contradict the current 'ongoing' status; not used to change it.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now", "media" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Access Now's STOP dataset records mobile internet as \"virtually inaccessible for most of 2022\" across Loikaw, Demoso, Bawlakhe, Hpasawng, and Mese townships in Kayah State, starting January 6 (Loikaw) and February 1 (the other four) for the remaining townships. The STOP record's own status field is \"Ongoing\" with no end date filled in — this reflects the dataset never being revisited after initial entry, not a confirmed claim that the blackout is still active as of 2026. No corroborating technical signal (OONI, BGP, IODA) was found or attempted for this event — it is STOP-anchored only, per M2 scope (detection-sequence backfill was limited to the top 5 events). Stale-ongoing review (2026-07): confirmed genuinely persisting, not a stale STOP record — active fighting in Karenni State continues through at least Q2 2026, with connectivity in these townships remaining severely restricted per contemporaneous reporting. See detection_sequence for the dated 2026 confirmation.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset record", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" }, { "label": "Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly, Feb–Apr 2026 (EngageMedia)", "url": "https://engagemedia.org/2026/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-february-2026-april-2026/" }, { "label": "Myanmar Now: Internet and phone blackouts worsen in Karenni State", "url": "https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/internet-and-phone-blackouts-worsen-in-karenni-state/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2022-kayah-mobile-blackout.csv", "json": "/data/events/2022-kayah-mobile-blackout.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "recovered_to_baseline" } }, { "id": "2022-tanintharyi-shutdown", "title": "Tanintharyi Region internet and phone disconnection, May 2022", "class": "regional", "type": "full_blackout", "status": "unresolved", "date_start": "2022-05-24T00:00:00.000Z", "resolution_note": "No source confirms when this specific May 2022 cutoff ended. Stale-ongoing review (M2 patch, 2026-07): evidence points against reading it as one unbroken 4-year blackout — this same area shows a pattern of distinct, separately-dated shutdown episodes through 2025 (coastal Launglon villages, Feb 2025–ongoing at time of report; Launglon township, May 31–Jun 21 2025; Dawei township, Jul 25 2025–ongoing at time of report), which only makes sense if connectivity was intermittently restored between incidents rather than continuously down since 2022. Reclassified from ongoing to unresolved rather than either assumed-continuous or guessed-ended. See internal research notes — flagged for a maintainer scope decision on whether Tanintharyi needs a recurring-pattern grouping analogous to 2025-sagaing-recurring-shutdowns.\n", "scope": { "regions": [ "Tanintharyi" ], "townships": [ "Dawei", "Launglong", "Thayetchaung" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2022-05-24T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: mobile internet and phone lines disconnected by the junta across Dawei, Launglong, and Thayetchaung townships, Tanintharyi Region.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "ioda", "at": "2026-07-18T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "IODA cross-check (maintainer research, 2026-07): queried region 2759 (Tanintharyi) directly. bgp: full data coverage throughout 2022, flat at a constant 'fully up' value with zero drop detected around May 24, 2022 or at any point through year-end. ping-slash24: this region DOES have real probe coverage (unlike Kayah) — day-by-day around the event date (May 15–Jun 14, 2022) shows normal noise-level single-day dips both before and after May 24 (typical of this signal generally), but no sustained drop coinciding with or following the reported cutoff date. Result: NO SIGNAL on either datasource, consistent with sub-country/mobile-level resolution limits — a three-township mobile/phone disconnection would not necessarily register at region-aggregate level. Does not resolve or contradict this event's unresolved status; not used to change it.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Access Now's STOP dataset records mobile internet and phone line disconnection by the military council starting May 24, 2022 across Dawei, Launglong, and Thayetchaung townships. As with the Kayah State record above, STOP's status field is \"Ongoing\" with no end date — reflecting the dataset not being revisited, not a live claim. STOP-anchored only; no detection-sequence backfill attempted (outside M2's top-5 scope).\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset record", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2022-tanintharyi-shutdown.csv", "json": "/data/events/2022-tanintharyi-shutdown.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "recovered_to_baseline" } }, { "id": "2025-starlink-restriction-pattern", "title": "Starlink restriction and confiscation pattern, 2024–2025", "class": "regional", "type": "starlink_blockade", "status": "ongoing", "date_start": "2024-07-21T00:00:00.000Z", "scope": { "regions": [ "Kachin", "Kayin", "Magway", "Kayah", "Chin", "Shan" ], "townships": [ "Myawaddy", "Kyain Seikgyi", "Myaing", "Mawchi", "Hakha", "Namtu", "Mogok", "Puta-O" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2024-07-21T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Earliest of 11 Access Now STOP records mentioning Starlink specifically, Kachin State.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-12-08T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Most recent: junta confiscates Starlink devices in Puta-O township, Kachin State.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Groups 11 Access Now STOP records that specifically name Starlink, spanning July 2024 to December 2025, across multiple actors and mechanisms: junta confiscation of devices (Puta-O, Dec 8 2025), TNLA-ordered restrictions and arrests of device owners (Namtu/ Man San, Oct 15 2025; Mogok area, Nov 23 2025), and Thai-border scam-crackdown overlap (Myawaddy/Kyain Seikgyi — this overlaps with 2025-02-thai-border- scam-crackdown-shutdown; flag for an editor whether these should be merged or the Starlink-specific angle kept separate). Checked IODA's historical region signals (bgp, ping-slash24) for Kachin region around the Dec 8, 2025 Puta-O incident: both flat, no disruption visible — expected and unsurprising, not a gap: Starlink is a satellite ISP, not part of the terrestrial routing infrastructure IODA's region-level BGP/active-probing signals measure, so device-level confiscation of Starlink terminals would never be expected to show up there (same structural finding as this site's broader Starlink-tracking research). No technical layer is included for this reason, not because it was unrecoverable. This is a SEPARATE, earlier wave from the 2026 Starlink border disruption event (2026-starlink-border-disruption.yaml), which is sourced from digest entries rather than STOP (STOP's corpus ends Dec 2025). Stale-ongoing review (2026-07): Starlink remains formally illegal under the military government and reporting from Q1 2026 shows continued restriction/use-under-ban in Sagaing and Magway — the general phenomenon clearly persists, but this event's own STOP-sourced record list stops at Dec 2025 and a successor event now exists for the 2026 wave. Kept ongoing per the stale-events pass's \"can't confirm either way\" rule rather than guessed either direction — see internal research notes for the scope question (close this at its Dec 2025 corpus limit vs. treat as the same continuing pattern as the 2026 event). Scope decision (maintainer research, 2026-07, separate question — merge with 2025-02-thai-border-scam-crackdown-shutdown?): kept SEPARATE. Same reasoning as that event's own note: this event is defined by SpaceX terminal-level restrictions and junta/TNLA device confiscations, distinct from the Thai-government-pressure-driven power/ISP cuts described in the scam-crackdown event, even where both touch Myawaddy/Kyain Seikgyi. Related event: see 2025-02-thai-border-scam-crackdown-shutdown for STOP records in the same border zone driven by the broader anti-scam crackdown rather than Starlink-specific action.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset — 11 Starlink-specific records, Jul 2024–Dec 2025", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" }, { "label": "CNN: SpaceX disables thousands of Starlink devices used by Myanmar scam centers", "url": "https://www.cnn.com/2025/10/23/asia/myanmar-starlink-scam-centers-spacex-intl-hnk" }, { "label": "The Record: SpaceX disables Starlink kits in Myanmar scam compounds", "url": "https://therecord.media/spacex-disables-starlink-kits-in-myanmar-scam-compounds" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2025-starlink-restriction-pattern.csv", "json": "/data/events/2025-starlink-restriction-pattern.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "inconclusive" } }, { "id": "2024-rakhine-connectivity-crisis", "title": "Rakhine State connectivity crisis, November 2024–2025", "class": "regional", "type": "full_blackout", "status": "ongoing", "date_start": "2024-11-16T00:00:00.000Z", "scope": { "regions": [ "Rakhine" ], "townships": [ "Kyaukpyu", "Ramree" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "corroborated", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2024-11-16T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: internet and phone lines cut across almost all of Rakhine State from evening of Nov 16 until at least Dec 4, after a heavy weapon reportedly hit an MPT tower in the An-Padan area amid AA–military council fighting. STOP's own record: 'it is unclear who directly caused the shutdown.'", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-01-03T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: Arakan Army (not the junta) reported imposing shutdowns in areas under its control across Rakhine State, citing security concerns around junta airstrikes.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "ooni_anomaly", "at": "2024-11-01T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "OONI country-level monthly anomaly rate elevated through this period: Oct 2024 25.9%, Nov 2024 26.8% (vs ~9-16% in the 2021-2022 baseline) — national-level context, not Rakhine-specific evidence.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "media", "at": "2026-01-26T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Mekong Eye (Jan 26, 2026): telecom outages in Rakhine State 'persisted for nearly 100 days' as of the report, affecting all 14 AA-occupied townships plus AA-occupied Paletwa (Chin State) and junta-controlled townships; farmers unable to access weather warnings ahead of Jul 2025 flooding. Irrawaddy separately reports the junta continuing to publicly justify the blackout as required to protect 'military secrets.' Stale-ongoing check (M2 patch): confirms persistence well past the 60-day window with dated sources.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now", "media" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Checked IODA's historical region-level signal for Rakhine (region code 2754) directly for both bgp and ping-slash24 datasources around Nov 16, 2024: both are flat/unchanged (BGP visibility constant at its baseline value throughout) — no routing-layer disruption was detectable, consistent with STOP's own account that the cause may have been physical damage to a tower rather than a deliberate route withdrawal. This null result is reported explicitly rather than omitted silently, per spec principle. STOP records name TWO different attributions across this cluster — the Nov 2024 record says cause is unclear (infrastructure damage, fuel shortage, and deliberate junta action all reported); the Jan 2025 record says the Arakan Army itself was imposing shutdowns in AA-held areas. Attribution question resolved (maintainer research, 2026-07): treated as ONE continuous, evolving disruption rather than two distinct causes or a split into separate events — attribution became clearer over time as AA consolidated territorial control, rather than the underlying disruption itself changing. Engage Media's Nov 2024–Jan 2025 quarterly frames this same period as a single ongoing connectivity crisis; conflict-tracking sources (ACAPS, CSIS) describe continuous AA territorial consolidation across the same townships through this window with no discrete break between the two attributions. Both detection_sequence entries are kept as-is (this is a presentation choice, not new evidence), now with the relationship between them stated explicitly rather than left as an open question. Later STOP records in this cluster (Jun, Aug ×2, Sep 2025 — all bare \"Rakhine State\" or Kyaukpyu/Ramree township) are summarized in scope/townships but not individually itemized in detection_sequence; full detail is in the exported CSV/JSON.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset — 6 Rakhine State records, Nov 2024–Sep 2025", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" }, { "label": "Mekong Eye: Myanmar's internet blackouts leave farmers without weather warnings", "url": "https://www.mekongeye.com/2026/01/26/myanmar-internet-weather" }, { "label": "Irrawaddy: Myanmar Military says Rakhine internet blackout still required", "url": "https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-rakhine-internet-blackout-still-required-protect-military-secrets.html" }, { "label": "Engage Media: Myanmar Digital Coup Quarterly, November 2024–January 2025", "url": "https://engagemedia.org/2025/myanmar-digital-coup-quarterly-november-2024-january-2025/" }, { "label": "ACAPS: Myanmar — access constraints in Rakhine state (18 Nov 2024)", "url": "https://www.acaps.org/fileadmin/Data_Product/Main_media/20241118_ACAPS_Myanmar-_Access_constraints_in_Rakhine_state_.pdf" }, { "label": "CSIS: Arakan Army Poised to 'Liberate' Myanmar's Rakhine State", "url": "https://www.csis.org/analysis/arakan-army-posed-liberate-myanmars-rakhine-state" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2024-rakhine-connectivity-crisis.csv", "json": "/data/events/2024-rakhine-connectivity-crisis.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "inconclusive" } }, { "id": "2025-01-rakhine-ayeyarwady-border-shutdown", "title": "Rakhine–Ayeyarwady border area shutdown amid Arakan Army fighting, January 2025", "class": "regional", "type": "full_blackout", "status": "unresolved", "date_start": "2025-01-02T00:00:00.000Z", "resolution_note": "No source confirms a resolution date for this specific junta-ordered cutoff. Stale-ongoing review (M2 patch, 2026-07): the Arakan Army captured Gwa township on Dec 29, 2024 — three days before this event's own date_start — and by Jan 2026 AA's civil administration was issuing licensed Starlink access to Gwa-area civilians, implying the original military-council-ordered cutoff most likely ended once the junta lost control of the area, followed by a different AA-administered access regime (a separate condition, not the same shutdown continuing). No source addresses this specific record directly, so reclassified unresolved rather than ended or left ongoing. See internal research notes — also flagged for a possible merge with 2024-rakhine-connectivity-crisis.\n", "scope": { "regions": [ "Rakhine", "Ayeyarwady" ], "townships": [ "Gwa", "Thabaung" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-01-02T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: internet and phone lines cut by the military council in multiple villages along the Pathein River and coast, Gwa township (Rakhine State) and Thabaung township (Ayeyarwady Region), amid Arakan Army–junta fighting.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "ioda", "at": "2026-07-18T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "IODA cross-check (maintainer research, 2026-07): queried regions 2754 (Rakhine) and 2756 (Ayeyarwady) for Dec 20, 2024–Feb 15, 2025. At this event's own Jan 2, 2025 start date: NO SIGNAL in either region on either datasource (Rakhine bgp/ping-slash24 both flat at baseline through Jan 24; Ayeyarwady bgp near-flat, ping-slash24 steady ~17.85 mean through Jan 24). A SEPARATE, real signal appears in BOTH regions starting Jan 25-28, 2025, ~3-4 weeks after this event's start: Rakhine ping-slash24 goes to a sustained data gap (ALL NULL) from Jan 25 onward (ambiguous — could be a real outage or an instrumentation/coverage loss, can't distinguish from this signal alone); Ayeyarwady ping-slash24 shows a genuine sustained step-down from ~17.85 to ~10.9 (not noise — a real, lasting level shift) from Jan 27-28 onward. NOT attributed to this event: the ~3-4 week timing gap doesn't match this event's Jan 2 date_start, and region-level data can't isolate Gwa/Thabaung specifically from the rest of Rakhine/Ayeyarwady. Logged here in case it's relevant to a different, not-yet-documented disruption — not used to set this event's date_end or change its status.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. STOP records this as coinciding with fighting between the Arakan Army and junta troops; local reports cited in the record say phone lines were cut immediately after junta troops fled a communication tower they had controlled. STOP's status field is \"Unknown\". STOP-anchored only; no detection-sequence backfill attempted.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset record", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2025-01-rakhine-ayeyarwady-border-shutdown.csv", "json": "/data/events/2025-01-rakhine-ayeyarwady-border-shutdown.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "inconclusive" } }, { "id": "2025-sagaing-recurring-shutdowns", "title": "Recurring township-level shutdowns across Sagaing Region, 2025", "class": "regional", "type": "full_blackout", "status": "ongoing", "date_start": "2025-01-29T00:00:00.000Z", "scope": { "regions": [ "Sagaing" ], "townships": [ "Tamu", "Homalin", "Kale", "Kani", "Budalin", "Banmauk", "Chaung-U", "Pale", "Monywa", "Salingyi", "Indaw" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-01-29T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "First of 15 Access Now STOP records for Sagaing Region townships through 2025 (Tamu township).", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-12-18T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Most recent of the 15 records (Indaw township, ended Dec 31, 2025).", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "media", "at": "2026-03-31T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Myanmar Internet Project (via EngageMedia/RFA), Jan–Mar 2026 quarterly: Sagaing remained the single most-affected region nationally — 27 townships hit by 196 airstrikes, and 96% of nationwide airstrikes during the quarter occurred in areas under internet shutdown. Myanmar Now separately reports the junta cutting internet 'indefinitely' to Sagaing as a resistance stronghold. Confirms the recurring-shutdown PATTERN (not any single constituent incident) continues well past this event's most recent individual record — consistent with the event's own framing as a pattern rather than one continuous blackout.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now", "media" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite, and needs an editorial decision on whether this grouping is the right presentation. This is NOT one continuous blackout — it groups 15 separate Access Now STOP records across 11 different Sagaing Region townships (Tamu, Homalin, Kale ×3, Kani ×2, Budalin, Banmauk, Chaung-U, Pale, Monywa, Salingyi, Indaw) spanning January through December 2025, each a discrete, mostly short (days-long where an end date is recorded) military-council shutdown tied to local fighting, offensives, or jamming. 6 of the 15 records have a confirmed STOP end date (durations ranging roughly 1–10 days); the other 9 are \"Unknown\" status with no end date. The pattern itself (recurrent Sagaing township shutdowns throughout the year) is well-evidenced; treating it as a single \"event\" with one date_start is an editorial simplification for this schema — full per-incident detail is preserved in the underlying STOP records, not lost, and data_links below export all 15 constituent records, not just the representative two in detection_sequence. Scope decision confirmed (maintainer research, 2026-07): grouping affirmed — kept as a single event rather than splitting high-population townships (e.g. Monywa) into their own entries. 2025 digital-repression reporting consistently frames Sagaing shutdowns as a region-wide, pattern-based campaign (recurring, junta-imposed blackouts tied to counter-insurgency operations) rather than isolated single-town incidents, and splitting out individual townships would create many near-duplicate event pages describing the same underlying campaign. Underlying per-township/per-record detail remains fully queryable in the exported CSV/JSON regardless.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset — 15 Sagaing Region records, 2025", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" }, { "label": "Myanmar Internet Project: Report on Communication Disruptions and Impacts in Regions Affected By Airstrikes (Jan–Mar 2026)", "url": "https://www.myanmarinternet.info/post/airstrike_and_internet_shutdown_jan_mar_2026" }, { "label": "Myanmar Now: junta cuts off internet access 'indefinitely' to resistance stronghold of Sagaing", "url": "https://myanmar-now.net/en/news/myanmar-junta-cuts-off-internet-access-indefinitely-to-resistance-stronghold-of-sagaing" }, { "label": "Myanmar Internet Project: 2025 Yearly Report on Digital Repression in Myanmar", "url": "https://www.myanmarinternet.info/post/yearly_report_2025-1" }, { "label": "The Irrawaddy: Sagaing Region Internet Shut Down Amid Myanmar Junta Raids", "url": "https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/sagaing-region-internet-shut-down-amid-myanmar-junta-raids.html" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2025-sagaing-recurring-shutdowns.csv", "json": "/data/events/2025-sagaing-recurring-shutdowns.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "inconclusive" } }, { "id": "2025-02-thai-border-scam-crackdown-shutdown", "title": "Thai-ordered power and internet cuts targeting Myawaddy scam compounds, February 2025", "class": "regional", "type": "full_blackout", "status": "ongoing", "date_start": "2025-02-04T00:00:00.000Z", "scope": { "regions": [ "Kayin", "Shan" ], "townships": [ "Myawaddy", "Kyain Seikgyi", "Tachileik", "Payanthonzu" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-02-04T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: Thai officials ordered internet, electricity, and fuel cuts across 5 areas in Myawaddy and Kyain Seikgyi townships (Kayin State) and Tachileik township (Shan State), to curb online scam operations.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Notable for being Thai-authority-ordered rather than junta-ordered — STOP's record names a specific electricity supplier (Myit Shwe Thaung Rin Company, linked to Karen Border Guard Force) that preemptively cut power before the official cutoff. A related Feb 21, 2025 STOP record (Payanthonzu, Kayin State) describes Thai authorities separately disabling AIS Thai-SIM mobile service — included here as the same border-scam-crackdown pattern, not a separate event. STOP's record notes the Myawaddy shutdown was still reported active as of July 2025 with residents relying on generators and Starlink to bypass restrictions — flagging this as a scope note for an editor since it overlaps thematically with the Starlink restriction pattern event, but the cause here (Thai-ordered, anti-scam) is distinct from the junta/TNLA Starlink actions in that event. Stale-ongoing review (2026-07): 2026-dated evidence (scam-compound solar/ Starlink workarounds, still-active compounds per satellite imagery) is consistent with the underlying Thai grid cutoff remaining in force but doesn't confirm it directly, and no source states it was lifted either. Kept ongoing rather than guessed either direction — see internal research notes. Scope decision (maintainer research, 2026-07): kept SEPARATE from 2025-starlink-restriction-pattern rather than merged, despite geographic/ temporal overlap in Myawaddy and Kyain Seikgyi. Different primary actors and mechanisms — this event is Thai-government-pressure-driven (power/ ISP/fuel cuts, junta/allied raids on scam compounds, connectivity loss as a side effect of clearing operations); the Starlink event is driven by SpaceX's own terminal-level restrictions and junta device confiscations. Related event: see 2025-starlink-restriction-pattern for STOP records in this same border zone that are specifically Starlink-restriction actions rather than the broader power/ISP crackdown described here.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset record", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" }, { "label": "The Diplomat: Myanmar Military Raids Major Scam Hub Close to Border With Thailand", "url": "https://thediplomat.com/2025/10/myanmar-military-raids-major-scam-hub-close-to-border-with-thailand/" }, { "label": "The Nation Thailand: Myanmar Scammers Adopt Starlink in Bid to Evade Internet Blackout", "url": "https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40052840" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2025-02-thai-border-scam-crackdown-shutdown.csv", "json": "/data/events/2025-02-thai-border-scam-crackdown-shutdown.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "inconclusive" } }, { "id": "2025-02-bago-paukkaung-shutdown", "title": "Paukkaung township internet cut amid military bombing, February 2025", "class": "regional", "type": "full_blackout", "status": "unresolved", "date_start": "2025-02-19T00:00:00.000Z", "resolution_note": "No source confirms a resolution date. Split from the former grouped event 2025-bago-region-shutdowns (maintainer research, 2026-07): Paukkaung (Feb 2025) and Nattalin (Dec 2025) are ten months apart, in different townships, and most plausibly tied to distinct military operations rather than one continuous regional pattern — kept as two separate events per the maintainer's explicit scope decision (internal research notes). Stale-ongoing review (M2 patch, 2026-07, carried over from before the split): a short, localized, bombing-triggered cutoff — general web search found no reporting of a continuing or renewed shutdown in this specific township into 2026. Reclassified from ongoing to unresolved rather than assumed still active.\n", "scope": { "regions": [ "Bago" ], "townships": [ "Paukkaung" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-02-19T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: internet cut in Paukkaung township during military bombing of surrounding villages, forcing civilian displacement.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Access Now STOP record: internet cut in Paukkaung township, Bago Region, during a military-council bombing campaign against surrounding villages that forced civilian displacement. Previously presented jointly with the Nattalin township shutdown (Dec 2025) as one \"Bago Region\" regional pattern; split into two events (maintainer research, 2026-07) since the two incidents are ten months apart, in different townships, with no evidence of simultaneous or continuous region-wide disruption — see 2025-12-bago-nattalin-shutdown for the other constituent record.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset record", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2025-02-bago-paukkaung-shutdown.csv", "json": "/data/events/2025-02-bago-paukkaung-shutdown.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "recovered_to_baseline" } }, { "id": "2025-12-bago-nattalin-shutdown", "title": "Nattalin township internet and phone cut amid heavy bombardment, December 2025", "class": "regional", "type": "full_blackout", "status": "unresolved", "date_start": "2025-12-09T00:00:00.000Z", "resolution_note": "No source confirms a resolution date. The STOP record's own \"Dec 9 – at least Dec 14\" phrasing is a confirmed-active window (a lower bound on duration), not an end date — no date_end is set here since Dec 14 marks only when the record was last confirmed active, not when the cutoff stopped. Split from the former grouped event 2025-bago-region-shutdowns (maintainer research, 2026-07): Nattalin (Dec 2025) and Paukkaung (Feb 2025) are ten months apart, in different townships, and most plausibly tied to distinct military operations rather than one continuous regional pattern — kept as two separate events per the maintainer's explicit scope decision (internal research notes). Stale-ongoing review (M2 patch, 2026-07, carried over from before the split): a short, localized, bombing-triggered cutoff — general web search found no reporting of a continuing or renewed shutdown in this specific township into 2026.\n", "scope": { "regions": [ "Bago" ], "townships": [ "Nattalin" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-12-09T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: internet and phone lines cut in Nattalin township (Dec 9 – at least Dec 14) amid heavy bombardment.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Access Now STOP record: internet and phone lines cut in Nattalin township, Bago Region, amid heavy bombardment, confirmed active from Dec 9 through at least Dec 14, 2025. Previously presented jointly with the Paukkaung township shutdown (Feb 2025) as one \"Bago Region\" regional pattern; split into two events (maintainer research, 2026-07) since the two incidents are ten months apart, in different townships, with no evidence of simultaneous or continuous region-wide disruption — see 2025-02-bago-paukkaung-shutdown for the other constituent record.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset record", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2025-12-bago-nattalin-shutdown.csv", "json": "/data/events/2025-12-bago-nattalin-shutdown.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "recovered_to_baseline" } }, { "id": "2025-yangon-vip-visit-jamming", "title": "Yangon Region jamming during junta-official visits, December 2025", "class": "regional", "type": "throttle", "status": "unresolved", "date_start": "2025-12-15T00:00:00.000Z", "resolution_note": "No source gives an end date for either incident. Stale-ongoing review (M2 patch, 2026-07): both are VIP-visit-triggered jamming/cutoffs, inherently bounded in nature (jamming tied to a specific visit ends when the visit ends) and structurally unlike the region's other, conflict-driven, open-ended blackouts. Reclassified from ongoing to unresolved — the narrative's own prior text already said as much (\"status is left as ongoing/unresolved\") but the schema didn't yet have a way to express that distinction before this patch.\n", "scope": { "regions": [ "Yangon" ], "townships": [ "Mingaladon", "North Okkalapa", "Thanlyin" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-12-15T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: jamming devices used by the military council in wards of Mingaladon and North Okkalapa townships during a deputy junta chief visit to a military nursing graduation ceremony.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-12-24T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record: internet and phone lines cut in Thanlyin township ahead of a visit by the junta leader.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. Two STOP records grouped as one pattern: both are short, localized jamming/cutoff incidents timed to specific military-official visits rather than conflict-driven blackouts, distinct in character from the Sagaing/Rakhine/Bago events. Neither STOP record gives an end date (both \"Unknown\" status) — these were likely brief, hours-long disruptions in practice, but nothing in the source confirms that. Duration question closed (maintainer research, 2026-07): confirmed Access Now/STOP is the only source covering either incident — no further duration or end-time confirmation exists to look for. resolution_note's existing \"unresolved, plausibly brief\" treatment stands as final, not as a gap awaiting more research.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset records", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2025-yangon-vip-visit-jamming.csv", "json": "/data/events/2025-yangon-vip-visit-jamming.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "recovered_to_baseline" } }, { "id": "2025-12-election-day-disruptions", "title": "Internet and phone disruptions around Myanmar's December 2025 election", "class": "national", "type": "throttle", "status": "ended", "date_start": "2025-12-27T00:00:00.000Z", "date_end": "2025-12-28T00:00:00.000Z", "scope": { "regions": [], "townships": [ "Kyankhin", "Loikaw", "Meiktila", "Myeik", "Sittwe", "Thandaunggyi" ], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "corroborated", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "stop", "at": "2025-12-27T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Access Now STOP record (status: Ended, end date Dec 28, 2025): an increase in internet service and phone line disruptions reported in cities and townships across Myanmar ahead of and on the sham election day, including Kyankhin, Loikaw, Meiktila, Myeik, Sittwe, and Thandaunggyi.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "bgp", "at": "2025-12-27T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Checked IODA's country-level BGP signal for Myanmar directly, Dec 20 2025 – Jan 2 2026: no dip — full-feed peer visibility held flat at ~918-924 throughout the election period, including Dec 27-28. Consistent with STOP's own framing (\"increase in disruptions\", application/mobile layer, not a national routing-level blackout).", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "access_now" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. This is the only event in this backfill batch with both a real STOP end date AND a clean null result actively checked (not just omitted) at the BGP layer — worth keeping the negative finding visible rather than dropping it, since \"no national BGP dip\" is itself informative: whatever caused the reported disruptions did not register as a country-level routing event. OONI's monthly aggregates for Nov 2025 (23.2%) and Dec 2025 (18.6%) don't show a clean spike either, though monthly granularity would dilute a 1-2 day event — this is inconclusive rather than corroborating or contradicting, and is not cited as a detection_sequence layer for that reason. Matches the site's own narrative claim of an election-period disruption event but with real measurement behind the \"how severe\" question, which the original unsourced claim didn't have.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "Access Now STOP Dataset record", "url": "https://www.accessnow.org/keepiton/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2025-12-election-day-disruptions.csv", "json": "/data/events/2025-12-election-day-disruptions.json" } }, { "id": "2026-starlink-border-disruption", "title": "Starlink terminal deactivations in resistance-held border regions, July 2026", "class": "regional", "type": "starlink_blockade", "status": "ongoing", "date_start": "2026-07-02T00:00:00.000Z", "scope": { "regions": [ "Kachin", "Kayah", "Rakhine", "Mandalay", "Sagaing" ], "townships": [], "asns": [], "operators": [] }, "confidence": "verified_ground", "detection_sequence": [ { "layer": "media", "at": "2026-07-06T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "DVB (english.dvb.no, tier A): SpaceX deactivated Starlink terminals nationwide as an anti-scam-hub measure, but the cutoff severed a lifeline for resistance-controlled regions; terminals reportedly offline since Thursday (Jul 2). More than 20% of active Starlink terminals in Myanmar deactivated. Named regions: Kachin, Karenni (Kayah), Arakan (Rakhine), Mandalay, Sagaing.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "media", "at": "2026-07-09T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Myanmar Now (Burmese original, machine-translated and independently re-verified this session): Starlink itself is the actor, citing lack of an operating license and 'restricted zones' designation, not a resistance-imposed measure. Notes the blockade coincides with, but is a distinct action from, the earlier ~2,500-device deactivation targeting scam centers.", "signal_ids": [] }, { "layer": "media", "at": "2026-07-09T00:00:00.000Z", "summary": "Burma News International (bnionline.net, tier C): displaced civilians, businesses, and humanitarian actors along the Thailand-Myanmar border report acute effects from the restriction.", "signal_ids": [] } ], "verified_by": [ "media" ], "narrative": "DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. This event was independently fact-checked earlier in this project's research (not re-derived from scratch here): DVB's article date is July 6, 2026 (our own digest entry's publishedAt metadata incorrectly says July 5 — flag for a digest-pipeline fix, separate from this event). \"Since Thursday\" in the DVB piece resolves to July 2, 2026, which is used as date_start. The 20%-of-terminals and named-region figures are DVB's own reporting, tier A. A separate digest item citing SpaceX disabling ~2,500 devices at scam centers, originally dated in our digest as 2026-06-02, was found during that same fact-check to actually be a re-syndication of an October 22, 2025 story (Lauren Dreyer's disclosure, same week as the KK Park raid) — an 8-month digest-metadata error, NOT part of this July 2026 event; excluded here for that reason, flagged separately for the digest pipeline. No OONI/BGP/IODA technical layer: this project's own investigation found that OONI's Starlink-ASN (AS14593) probe-originated measurements for Myanmar had already dropped to zero starting June 10, 2026 — three weeks before this event's July 2 start — and stayed at zero throughout, which is inconsistent with (not supporting of) attributing a technical signal specifically to this event; that anomaly is unexplained and separate. A total-network OONI measurement volume dip was observed Jul 6-7, 2026 but could not be cleanly attributed to this event either. Per the caution already applied in this project's research: media-sourced only, verified_ground tier, not overstated as technically confirmed.\n", "sources": [ { "label": "DVB (english.dvb.no)", "url": "https://english.dvb.no/starlink-disruptions-hit-myanmar-amid-crackdown-on-cyber-scam-hubs/" }, { "label": "Myanmar Now", "url": "https://myanmar-now.org/mm/news/79441/" }, { "label": "Burma News International", "url": "https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/users-along-thailand-myanmar-border-fear-isolation-spacex-restricts-starlink-internet-access" }, { "label": "New Day Myanmar", "url": "https://newdaymyanmar.com/starlink-service-restricted-for-many-users-in-myanmar-border-areas/" } ], "data_links": { "csv": "/data/events/2026-starlink-border-disruption.csv", "json": "/data/events/2026-starlink-border-disruption.json" }, "technical_corroboration": { "layer": "ioda", "last_checked": "2026-07-20T00:00:00.000Z", "result": "inconclusive" } } ]