Internet and phone disruptions around Myanmar's December 2025 election
2025-12-27 → 2025-12-28
DRAFT — needs an editor rewrite. This is the only event in this backfill batch with both a real STOP end date AND a clean null result actively checked (not just omitted) at the BGP layer — worth keeping the negative finding visible rather than dropping it, since "no national BGP dip" is itself informative: whatever caused the reported disruptions did not register as a country-level routing event. OONI's monthly aggregates for Nov 2025 (23.2%) and Dec 2025 (18.6%) don't show a clean spike either, though monthly granularity would dilute a 1-2 day event — this is inconclusive rather than corroborating or contradicting, and is not cited as a detection_sequence layer for that reason. Matches the site's own narrative claim of an election-period disruption event but with real measurement behind the "how severe" question, which the original unsourced claim didn't have.
Detection sequence
- Access Now STOP
Access Now STOP record (status: Ended, end date Dec 28, 2025): an increase in internet service and phone line disruptions reported in cities and townships across Myanmar ahead of and on the sham election day, including Kyankhin, Loikaw, Meiktila, Myeik, Sittwe, and Thandaunggyi.
- BGP
Checked IODA's country-level BGP signal for Myanmar directly, Dec 20 2025 – Jan 2 2026: no dip — full-feed peer visibility held flat at ~918-924 throughout the election period, including Dec 27-28. Consistent with STOP's own framing ("increase in disruptions", application/mobile layer, not a national routing-level blackout).